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INTERPRETING WISCONSIN STATUTES
DANIEL R. SUHR
The seminal case on statutory interpretation in recent years is State ex rel.
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58. . . . In Kalal, the
court emphasized the importance of statutory text when it embraced the principle that a court’s role is to determine what a statute means rather than determine what the legislature intended.1
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser, 2014
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INTRODUCTION

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court of Dane County2 is a watershed decision in the modern history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. First
published in May 2004, the case has already been cited in over 800
subsequent published decisions of Wisconsin’s appellate courts, mak-
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 B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.P.A. A lawyer in Madison, Wisconsin, Suhr previously served as a
law clerk for Judge Diane Sykes on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Joe Poehlmann, MULS Class of 2016.
1. Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶¶ 130–31, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850
N.W.2d 866 (Prosser, J. concurring). See Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI
19, ¶ 84 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting) (referring to “seminal rules of statutory interpretation
set forth in Kalal”).
2. 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
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ing it the most cited case of modern times.3 Kalal transformed statutory interpretation in Wisconsin, shifting state courts from a vaguely intentionalist interpretive method to what Professor Abbe Gluck of Yale
Law School calls “the new modified textualism.”4 Kalal promulgated a
uniform method for interpreting state statutes that all Wisconsin
courts are now to follow. Moreover, its methodology has been extended to other types of public law in Wisconsin: federal statutes, municipal ordinances, state administrative rules, municipal administrative
rules, and Supreme Court rules.5 It is, according to the Court, “the
bedrock of the judiciary’s methodology.”6
Now, more than ten years after Kalal’s issuance, the time is right to
evaluate the case’s interpretation and impact. This Article proceeds in
four parts. First, I briefly sketch the history of statutory interpretation
in Wisconsin prior to Kalal, and then covers the core principles of the
case itself. In the second section, I ask whether Kalal has worked, so to
speak—has it successfully replaced history and purpose with text and
meaning? I do so by evaluating the use of extrinsic sources like legislative history in the ten years prior to Kalal with the ten years since its issuance. Third, as Kalal set forth a broad new standard, it left many
methodological questions to be decided in subsequent cases, such as
what tools are available to determine statutory meaning, when a statute is ambiguous, and what tools are appropriate to resolve that ambiguity. Finally, I address the future of statutory interpretation with a
specific focus on an ongoing effort to undermine Kalal.

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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3. Data drawn from Westlaw’s Keycite feature.
Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contex
tData=(sc.Default) (search in search bar for ”2004 WI 58”; then follow ”Citing References”
hyperlink; then follow “Cases” hyperlink under “View”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
4. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010).
5. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2006 WI 88, ¶¶ 35–36, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 717
N.W.2d 280 (federal statutes); Magnolia v. Town of Magnolia, 2005 WI App 119, ¶ 9, 284
Wis. 2d 361, 701 N.W.2d 60 (municipal ordinances); Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. Menasha
Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶ 63, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95 (state administrative rules); Nelson
& Sons Painting v. Cardenas, No. 2007AP645, 2007 WL 2935808, at ¶ 9 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
10, 2007) (municipal administrative rules); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶ 30, 325 Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631 (Op. of Prosser, Roggensack,
and Ziegler, Js.) (supreme court rules). The question has been discussed elsewhere whether
it should also be applied to state constitutional interpretation. Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI
96, ¶ 20, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888; Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 93 (2013).
6. Wisconsin Carry, Inc., 2017 WI 19, ¶ 18.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 155 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

6 SUHR-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

INTERPRETING WISCONSIN STATUTES

6/12/17 2:00 PM

971

My goals are both practical and academic. For the practitioner, I
hope to synthesize the case law on public law interpretation in Wisconsin, setting forth the definitive summary of the court’s method. I
aim to explain for lawyers and judges what tools are available for statutory interpretation and what standards apply to discern statutory
meaning. And I expect to identify and develop areas of interpretation
where further clarification is needed.
From an academic perspective, I hope to illuminate Kalal’s effect—
was it successful in cabining the use of legislative history? Can courts
achieve the “methodological consensus” proposed by Professor Gluck
and others,7 or have subsequent decisions from the Wisconsin Supreme Court and lower courts undermined or avoided the clear rule of
Kalal? Do judges cite it formulaically, or do they actually follow its
holding and the larger principles that animated it? As Wisconsin is
one of the few states in the country with a well-established textualist
methodology for statutory interpretation, answers to these questions
can serve both the development of Wisconsin law and the progress of
legal theory in other states.
A Wisconsin attorney once titled his history of our state’s high
court The Story of a Great Court.8 A century since that book was published, the Wisconsin Supreme Court may have reached something the
U.S. Supreme Court has not found in the modern era: consensus about
how judges should read statutes. If this Article’s review of “Kalal at
Ten” vindicates that conclusion, such consensus will be an achievement worthy of a great court.

A principle courts recite with regularity today in fact stretches back
decades: “when the meaning of a statute is plain or unambiguous it is
not open to construction.”9 In a student note for the 1940 volume of
the Wisconsin Law Review, Conrad Shearer goes on to say that though
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7. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 4; Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in PRECEDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Christopher
J. Peters, ed.) (2013); Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008).
8. JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW, THE STORY OF A GREAT COURT: BEING A SKETCH HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN, ITS JUDGES AND THEIR TIMES FROM THE ADMISSION
OF THE STATE TO THE DEATH OF CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN (1912).
9. Conrad J. Shearer, Statutory Construction—Use of Extrinsic Aids in Wisconsin, 1940
WIS. L. REV. 453, 454 (citations omitted).
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“the words of a statute are the most direct evidence of that ‘intention
of the legislature,’” there are times when “the complexity of events and
the frailties of draftsmen” prompt recourse to “interpretation materials
extrinsic to the words of the statute,” i.e., legislative history.10
Twenty-five years later, another University of Wisconsin law student revisited the question and restated the conclusion: “The Wisconsin Supreme Court has often said that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, construction is not permitted.”11 However, at the time he
also recognized that “the Wisconsin cases decided since 1940 disclose
an increasingly liberal trend in allowing the use of extrinsic evidence.”12 This liberal trend continued such that Wisconsin Supreme
Court Chief Justice Bruce Beilfuss would in 1976 equate plain meaning
and extrinsic evidence as two equally accepted methods for interpretation.13
And so cases continued to set forth relatively formulaic litanies
concerning statutory interpretation. In fact, just the term before Kalal,
the Court said in VanCleve v. City of Marinette: “it is a well established
rule that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
court must not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the
statute’s meaning. Only when statutory language is ambiguous may
we examine other construction aids such as legislative history, context,
and subject matter.”14
Yet for each decision like VanCleve, there was another the very
same term like State v. Byers, in which the majority opinion relied on
text, legislative history, and public policy without an initial finding of

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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10. Id. at 453–54.
11. Brad A. Liddle, Jr., Statutory Construction—Legislative Intent—Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Wisconsin, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 660, 660 (first citing Estate of Riebs, 8 Wis. 2d 110, 98 N.W.2d
453 (1959); then State ex rel. Badtke v. School Board, 1 Wis. 2d 208, 83 N.W.2d 724 (1957)).
Even after his extended discussion of extrinsic evidence, Mr. Liddle himself seems sympathetic to the text-first approach that would come in Kalal. He concludes his article:
It is unreasonable to expect a Wisconsin attorney to journey to the Legislative Reference Library in Madison to research the intimate history of each statute he encounters representing clients. The courts should give sufficient weight to statutory words
so that lawyers may confidently rely on that which they read in the published statute.
Id. at 670.
12. Id. at 660.
13. Student Ass’n of Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294–95,
246 N.W.2d 622 (1976).
14. VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, ¶ 17, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113.
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ambiguity, in clear contravention of the principles set forth in VanCleve
just months before.15 Thus, concurring in Byers, Chief Justice Shirley
Abrahamson could write: “Even a casual observer of the Wisconsin
cases would, without fear of being contradicted, summarize the case
law as adopting inconsistent approaches to statutory interpretation.”16
Lower courts also operated under unclear and contradictory principles for statutory interpretation. In a decision published three years
before Kalal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals said: “The spirit and intention of a statute should govern over its literal meaning. ”17 Yet a
term earlier, the same court of appeals labeled it “judicial legislation at
its worst” to use a statute’s supposed purpose to override its plain language.18 In other words, the supreme court itself, lower courts, and
the bar all felt the confusion evident in the court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence.
In fact, Justice Diane Sykes begins the statutory interpretation section of Kalal by acknowledging: “Wisconsin’s statutory interpretation
case law has evolved in something of a combination fashion, generating some analytical confusion.”19 This confusion prompts her to “conclude that the general framework for statutory interpretation in Wisconsin requires some clarification,”20 leading into the heart of Kalal.
The task before the Court in the relevant section of Kalal is an innocuous one: interpret Wisconsin Statutes section 968.02(3) governing
private filings of criminal complaints.21 Justice Sykes, however, sets
out to provide “some clarification” to the “analytical confusion” then

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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15. In re Commitment of Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶¶ 63–65, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729
(Crooks, J., dissenting).
16. Id. ¶ 46 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). See In re Commitment of Burris, 2004 WI
91, ¶ 32, 273 Wis. 2d 294, 682 N.W.2d 812 (noting “[t]his court has been wrestling with statutory interpretation in recent years”).
17. Gasper v. Parbs, 2001 WI App 259, ¶ 11, 249 Wis. 2d 106, 637 N.W.2d 399 (citing
Sprague v. Sprague, 132 Wis. 2d 68, 72, 389 N.W.2d 823, 824 (Ct. App. 1986)).
18. Zink v. Khwaja, 2000 WI App 58, ¶ 16 n.6, 233 Wis. 2d 691, 608 N.W.2d 394 (quoting Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 197 Wis. 2d 731, 754, 541 N.W.2d
786 (Ct. App. 1995)).
19. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 43, 271 Wis. 2d 633,
681 N.W.2d 110 (majority opinion). Elsewhere she prefaces a comment by saying, “[T]o the
extent that there was some confusion in this area, we have clarified the principles that govern statutory interpretation in Kalal.” State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 108 n.39, 273 Wis. 2d 1,
681 N.W.2d 203.
20. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44 (majority opinion).
21. Id. ¶ 4.
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22. Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
23. Id. ¶ 44. For a further discussion of the folly of consulting legislative history during
statutory interpretation, see Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶ 40 n.23.
24. Id. ¶ 45.
25. Id. ¶¶ 46, 49.
26. Id. ¶ 46.
27. Id. ¶¶ 49 n.8, 52.
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regnant in Wisconsin’s statutory construction jurisprudence.22 She begins:
It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to
faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so requires a determination of statutory
meaning. Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed
in the statutory language. Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the primary focus
of inquiry. It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public. Therefore, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper,
and intended effect.23
In order to honor this solemn obligation, statutory construction begins with the language of the statute, giving its words their “common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or speciallydefined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.”24 Beyond the words themselves, context, the structure of the statute, explicit statements of legislative purpose, and canons like the avoidance of surplusage are important tools to read a
statute’s plain meaning.25 And there the inquiry ends if these tools
lead to a plain meaning; no resort to extrinsic sources is permitted or
required.26
The majority is clear that this is “more than a mistrust of legislative
history or cynicism about the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be manipulated.”27 This method finds its footing on deeper
foundations:
The principles of statutory interpretation that we have
restated here are rooted in and fundamental to the rule
of law. Ours is “a government of laws not men,” and
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“it is simply incompatible with democratic government,
or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver
meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, at 17 (Princeton University Press, 1997). “It is the law that governs,
not the intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what
they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which
bind us.”28
In her concurrence, Chief Justice Abrahamson “part[s] company
with the majority” and instead defends the use of extrinsic sources of
all types in all cases, stating that a court may “examine history without
declaring an ambiguity,” regardless of whether the text’s meaning is
plain.29 After defending legislative history produced in Wisconsin
against the “bad reputation” sometimes associated with federal legislative history, she lays out thirteen potential extrinsic sources that courts
could consider.30 She ends by urging the Court to adopt the Canadian
method of interpretation, which looks at “total context” and “all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning” which might
“promote the legislative purpose . . . and produce a reasonable and
just meaning.”31 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley “commend[s] both the
majority and the concurrence for their endeavors” to explicate statutory interpretation, but she “ultimately join[s] neither.”32

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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28. Id. ¶ 52 (emphasis omitted) (citing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 17 (1997)).
29. Id. ¶¶ 63–64 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
30. Id. ¶ 69.
31. Id. ¶ 70. For instances where Abrahamson adopted reasoning that reflects the
same principles as Kalal, see also State v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶ 47, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693
N.W.2d 703 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree with the court of appeals that the statutory phrase ‘term of supervision’ means exactly what it says. The text of the statute matters.
When the legislature wanted to refer to ‘expiration of the sentence’ and ‘discharged by the
department,’ it used those words.”); Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 39-40, 452
N.W.2d 555, 564 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (questioning the reliability of federal
legislative history); State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 85, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (identifying the danger of bias in the reading of history during interpretation)
32. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 74 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). For an instance where
Bradley adopted reasoning that reflects the same principle as Kalal, see Haferman v. St.
Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, ¶ 42 n.9, 286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853 (majority opinion) (“In focusing on the ‘actual intent’ of one member of the senate, the dissent
answers the wrong question. The question is not: what was the intent of a single legislator?
Rather, the question is: what was intended by the legislature as a whole, given the language
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of the statutes?”).
33. Kalal, 2004 WI 58.
34. State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203.
35. Id. ¶ 17.
36. Id. ¶ 39.
37. Id. ¶¶ 40, 43.
38. Id. ¶ 44.
39. Id. ¶ 102 (Sykes, J., concurring).
40. Id. ¶¶ 102–03.
41. Id. ¶¶ 91, 104 & n.38.
42. Id.
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Kalal was issued on May 25, 2004.33 Not a month later, the Court
issued State v. Hayes.34 The lead opinion was written by Chief Justice
Abrahamson and does not reference Kalal, but instead considers “(A)
the context of the statute; (B) the history of the statute; and (C) the
purposes and consequences of the parties’ competing interpretations.”35 After finding the statutory context and legislative history inconclusive, she turns to the “consequences of alternative interpretations.”36 The State argued “strong policy reasons” for its position, yet
the defendant argued it would be “manifestly unjust” to adopt the
State’s view.37 Abrahamson sides with the defendant: “Although the
State makes a number of good policy, purpose, and consequence arguments, ultimately we are not persuaded by them.”38
In her concurrence, Justice Sykes sets about with a vengeance on
Abrahamson’s lead opinion, labeling it “47 paragraphs [of] an unusual, freewheeling method of statutory interpretation. . . .”39 In Sykes’s
view, Abrahamson’s opinion vindicates her critique of legislative history made in Kalal, as Abrahamson’s review of the history here “discover[s] contradictory and misleading information” that is “inconclusive;” “[u]ltimately, this interpretive journey leads nowhere (at each
stage we are told there are good arguments all around),” and so the
court “eventually makes its own policy choice” to resolve the case.40
Sykes also sets forth her view that Kalal “recently clarified” the “legal principles governing statutory interpretation” that courts must follow, saying they cannot “be dismissed as mere ‘spirited discussions’ or
‘vigorous discussions’ by ‘part of the court,’” but rather are part of a
majority decision that is “binding precedent” that “cannot simply be
ignored.”41 To use terminology from the literature, the Court in Kalal
did not merely achieve methodological consensus; it mandated methodological consistency.42
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Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, concurring in Hayes, predicts, “the new
‘bright line’ rules of statutory interpretation recently set forth by the
majority in Kalal will be often mouthed but not always applied.”43 She
forecasts “a continuing discussion” of the topic, including the “well intentioned, but nevertheless early and often misapplication by the Kalal
majority of the ‘new’ bright line rules of statutory interpretation.”44
Elsewhere Abrahamson suggests that “the court (some members more
than others) [would] silently take a holistic approach anyway, despite
lip service to the ambiguous/unambiguous/plain meaning shibboleths.”45 In the next section of this article, I investigate whether their
prophecies have been realized—do courts cite Kalal only to ignore its
intended effect, or has the opinion made a measurable difference in the
way courts handle cases?
III. KALAL’S EFFECT OVER TIME

C M
Y K
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43. Id. ¶ 67 (Bradley, J., concurring).
44. Id. ¶ 68.
45. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶ 70, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d
258 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
46. Teschendorf, 2006 WI 89, ¶¶ 12–15. Justice Prosser listed three circumstances when
it would be appropriate for a court to consider extrinsic evidence given the Court’s ongoing
commitment to Kalal. First, “if the meaning of the statute is ambiguous after considering all
intrinsic sources.” Second, “if the meaning of the statute is plain, we sometimes look to legislative history to confirm the plain meaning.” Third, if the meaning “appears to be plain
but that meaning produces absurd results,” then extrinsic sources may be used “to verify
that the legislature did not intend these unreasonable or unthinkable results.”
47. Full list: “judicial council” or “legislative council” or “assembly committee” or
“senate committee” or “drafting record” or “bulletin of proceedings” or “veto message” or
“legislative reference bureau” or “legislative fiscal bureau” or “caucus” or “legislative
committee.”

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 158 Side A

In this part, I consider whether Kalal has achieved its goal: has it
cabined the use of extrinsic sources, especially legislative history, to
only those cases where it is necessary and appropriate to do so?46
In order to answer this question, I compared the ten years preceding Kalal (1993–2003) with the ten years following Kalal (2005–2015). I
put together a series of eleven search terms that would evidence extrinsic sources, such as “assembly committee,” “drafting record,” or
“Legislative Fiscal Bureau.”47 Searching on this basis is necessarily
both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive in that it will capture cases where a court used extrinsic sources in a constitutional interpretation case (where they are currently permitted), or used search
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terms in the facts section, or found ambiguity and then looked to extrinsic sources to resolve that ambiguity, or used extrinsic sources to
confirm a statute’s plain meaning, or where extrinsic sources were only used in dissent. It is under-inclusive in that it may exclude extrinsic
sources not covered by the search terms. It also only counts published
opinions, excluding all circuit court cases and unpublished Court of
Appeals cases. Nevertheless, I believe that this search method gives us
a sufficient snapshot of judicial activity to capture a valid conclusion.
These are the data:

1993
–
2003
2005
–
2015

WICA
Published
Decisions

WICA
Decisions
using
Search
Terms

WISC
Published
Decisions

WISC
Decisions
using
Search
Terms

178

WICA %
of Published
Decisions using
Search
Terms
2.105

WISC %
of Published
Decisions using
Search
Terms
1.570

14583

307

11337

10274

137

10175

184

1.333

1.808

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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These results indicate that Kalal’s primary impact was at the court
of appeals—the absolute number of cases using extrinsic sources
dropped by more than half between the two decades. By contrast, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court remained consistent in absolute terms in its
use of the search terms. When looked at as a percentage, the Court of
Appeals saw nearly a halving of its citations, while the Supreme Court
increased its citations slightly.
There are several possible conclusions from this observation. One
may be that the Supreme Court did not use much legislative history
before Kalal, and Justice Sykes’ primary target was the excessive usage
happening within the Court of Appeals. Another possibility is that the
Court of Appeals feels bound by Kalal, while some or all justices of the
Supreme Court do not feel as bound by Kalal, and therefore continue
to use extrinsic sources. Yet another explanation might be that the Supreme Court is more likely to hear the complicated cases where a stat-
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ute is likely to be ambiguous, and therefore extrinsic sources are necessary, whereas the Court of Appeals stopped using legislative history in
cases where the meaning was already plain. In all events, even given
the over- and under-inclusive nature of the searches, it seems clear that
Kalal significantly reduced the use of legislative history by the court of
appeals.
IV. QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
Justice Sykes, the author of Kalal, has been honest to acknowledge
the limits of the opinion, “recogniz[ing] that these principles are of
general application and therefore may require supplementation by
special or additional rules applicable to specific problems of interpretation in particular cases.”48 In this section, we will flesh out some of the
“special or additional rules” that the court has pronounced in the wake
of Kalal.
A. What Tools are Available to Determine the Plain Meaning of a Statute?

C M
Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

48. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 104 (Sykes, J., concurring).
49. Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶ 79 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting).
50. Cty. of Dane v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 2009 WI 9, ¶ 23, 315 Wis. 2d 293,
759 N.W.2d 571. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 53–54,
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (majority opinion) (looking to the American Heritage Dictionary definition to elucidate the plain meaning of a statutory term).
51. Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual (2005–06). See State
v. James P. (In re Chezron M.), 2005 WI 80, ¶ 25, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698 N.W.2d 95.
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A court always begins its analysis by evaluating the plain meaning
of the statute. “Cases that turn on statutory interpretation generally
begin the analysis by setting forth the text of the statute.”49 Sometimes
reading the text in front of the court is sufficient. Other times, the
court must do some work to discern the plain meaning, which is more
than simply the words on the page of the statute book. There are tools
available to determine the plain meaning of a statute. One is a dictionary; “consulting a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of undefined
words in a statute does not mean that those words are ambiguous.”50
Another source for statutory definitions may be the Legislative Reference Bureau’s Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual, which guides drafters’
use of certain words to maintain consistency across the statutes.51
Other tools are the scope, context, and purpose of the statute, so
long as they are “ascertainable from the text and structure of the stat-
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ute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history.”52
“Context usually refers to the relationship with other statutes. Context
also can mean factual setting.”53 Context can also mean reading the
entirety of a provision rather than an isolated sentence or snip-it
stripped from a larger block of language.54 Context and statutory purpose may also be guides to which of multiple dictionary definitions is
the appropriate one.55 Canons of statutory construction are also appropriate tools to illuminate plain meaning; they are not extrinsic
sources like legislative history.56
The Court has debated whether statutory history—previously enacted versions of a particular statute—constitutes an internal source
that may be used to illuminate plain meaning or an extrinsic source
that may only be used to resolve ambiguity.57 In County of Dane v.
LIRC, the Court’s majority reviewed past versions of a statute as part
of the plain-meaning analysis, drawing the ire of Chief Justice Abrahamson, who considered this beyond the analysis’s proper scope.58
Commenting on the case, Andrew Hitt has argued that statutory history should be seen as an intrinsic aid within the Kalal framework.59 In a
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52. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 48.
53. Seider v. O’Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659 (citation
omitted). See, e.g., City of Madison v. Dept. of Health Services, 2016AP727 (Wis. Ct. App.
March
9,
2017),
https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=1858
83 [https://perma.cc/89XJ-4XM8] (discussing legislative purpose and relationship to other
statutes).
54. Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605
N.W.2d 515 (“While it is true that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the
statute, it is also well established that courts must not look at a single, isolated sentence or
portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant language in the entire statute.”).
55. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 49 (context); State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶ 16, 277
Wis. 2d 400, 690 N.W.2d 452 (purpose).
56. See In re Chezron M., 2005 WI 80, ¶ 26. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
57. Compare Cty. of Dane v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 2009 WI 9, ¶ 27, 315 Wis.
2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (majority opinion), with id. ¶¶ 47–51 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Andrew Hitt, The Debate over Statutory History, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH.: FAC. BLOG
(Aug.
5,
2009), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/08/05/the-debate-overstatutory-history/ [https://perma.cc/4YM8-B3EK] (“As provided in Sutherland’s Statutes
and Statutory Construction, intrinsic aids are canons of construction (e.g., grammar, punctuation, or textual canons), dictionary definitions, titles, context, scope, and surrounding statutes. Previously enacted versions of a statute fall nicely within the realm of these other intrinsic tools because the focus remains on the statutory text. One would be confined to the
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subsequent case, the Court again used statutory history as part of the
plain-meaning analysis, confirming County of Dane’s ongoing vitality.60
All of these tools underline a fundamental reality: plain meaning is
not the same as obvious meaning. Kalal does not require that the
meaning of a particular sentence leap off the page in isolation, and anything less than obviousness is ambiguity. Rather, courts must do the
intellectual work often necessary to determine the only reasonable
reading of a text.61
B. What if the Plain Meaning Leads to an Absurd Result?
On July 22, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its decision
in Force v. American Family Insurance Co.62 The same day, a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided Halbig v. Burwell.63
The first case concerned a wrongful-death action;64 the second was a
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statute’s text—either the current or the previous version. Unlike typical types of extrinsic
evidence, such as common law and legislative history, the legislature has voted on previous
versions of a statute. To the extent that words or phrases have been added or subtracted
over the years, this provides great insight as to what the legislature meant when it worded
the current version of the statute. Concerns about legislative history and other materials
not voted on by the legislature do not apply to previous versions of a statute.”).Justice Scalia is generally the north-star reference point on all questions of textualism, legislative history, and statutory interpretation. Though I was unable to find any direct commentary on
previously enacted versions from him, two cases indicate that he would likely consider
them in the category of legislative history. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519–25
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).It is a
separate problem how to handle statutory changes made after the version of a statute at issue in a case. Justice A.W. Bradley looked at, but did not necessarily rely upon, a subsequent statutory change to suggest that the Legislature broadened a statute’s scope to fix the
restriction identified by the case at hand, which was filed when a previous version of the
statute was in effect. State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶¶ 73–74 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting). Reliance on accepted or rejected amendments to a statute is generally frowned upon by scholars and courts. See, e.g., Charles H. Willard & John W. MacDonald, Effect of an Unsuccessful
Attempt to Amend a Statute, 44 CORNELL L. REV. 336 (1959); William N. Eskridge, Jr., PostEnactment Legislative Signals, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 75 (1994); Larry M. Eig, Statutory
Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Cong. Research Service (Dec. 19, 2011),
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKH-MUTT].
60. State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, ¶ 46, 363 Wis. 2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387.
61. See, e.g., In re Chezron M., 2005 WI 80, ¶¶ 22–38.
62. Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866.
For another discussion of the absurd-results doctrine, see Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare
Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, ¶¶ 23, 25, 56–59, 286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853 (wherein Justice A.W. Bradley insists that the Court cannot “rewrite” a statute to fix a perceived error).
63. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
64. Force, 2014 WI 82, ¶ 4.
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65. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 393.
66. For a general discussion of the doctrine, see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003), and Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 718 N.W.2d 784
(Mich. 2006).
67. Force, 2014 WI 82, ¶¶ 21–26 (covering all facts).
68. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.
69. Id. ¶¶ 7, 23.
70. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
71. Id. ¶ 17.
72. Id. ¶ 17.
73. Id. ¶¶ 10, 57.
74. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 68.
75. Id. ¶¶ 1–129.
76. See id. ¶¶ 130–47.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 160 Side B

challenge to the Affordable Care Act.65 Though the courts and cases
were very different, both included a discussion of the absurd-results
doctrine, and each took its own attitude as to the breadth and capaciousness of the precedents.66
Force centered on a wrongful-death action brought by family members of the deceased.67 Billy Joe Force was killed in a car accident in
2008.68 His wife, whom he had separated from but not divorced in
1997, brought a wrongful-death action as was her statutory right as the
“surviving spouse.”69 The circuit court granted summary judgment
for zero damages, deciding that the wife suffered no compensable
damages given their eleven-year separation, the last five of which they
had zero contact.70 The minor children, who stand next in the statutory hierarchy if there is no surviving spouse, then appealed.71
A majority of the court concluded that the estranged wife is not a
“surviving spouse” under the statute, and therefore the right to bring
the claim flowed to the children.72 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson delves deeply into the “fundamental purposes” of
the wrongful-death statute73 and says to rule otherwise would be an
“absurd, unreasonable result.”74 Abrahamson, however, gives no attention to Kalal, a case she assiduously avoids citing.75
Justice David Prosser, who joined the majority, wrote an extended
concurrence on the absurd-results doctrine within the framework of
Kalal.76 He quotes the operative language from Kalal:
Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the structure of the statute in which the operative language appears. Therefore, statutory language is to be interpreted
in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as
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part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.77
Prosser proceeds to provide seven examples from 1955 to 2006
when Wisconsin appellate courts recited the absurd-results doctrine as
part of the overall statutory interpretation scheme.78 He then said,
Absurd results are much more than undesirable results.
Absurd results are aberrations that clash with the manifest purpose of a statute or related statutes (evidenced
by statutory language) and cannot be explained as a rational exception to the statutory scheme. Absurd results
are usually unexpected. They are different from harsh
consequences because they are seldom the fault of an
adversely affected party. Instead, they almost always
result from circumstances beyond the party’s control.
Absurd results produce hardship or unfairness that is
quickly recognized and cannot be ignored.79
Justice Annette Ziegler, writing in dissent, replies to Prosser’s argument that her interpretation would create an absurd result: “An unpalatable result is not the same as an absurd result. . . . The court
should not avoid the plain language of a statute in order to prevent
unpleasant results.”80
In the Halbig decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, written by Judge Thomas Griffith and issued the same day as
Force, that court declines the government’s invitation to rely on the absurd-results doctrine.81 Under the D.C. Circuit’s version of the doctrine, the court “will not give effect to a state’s literal meaning when
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77. Id. ¶ 132 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46,
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) (emphasis added by Prosser).
78. Id. ¶¶ 136–42 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing Worachek v. Stephenson Town Sch.
Dist., 270 Wis. 116, 124, 70 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1955); Isaksen v. Chesapeake Instrument Corp.,
19 Wis. 2d 282, 289–90, 120 N.W.2d 151, 155–56 (1963); Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34
Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447, 454 (1967); Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000
WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515; Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI
89, ¶ 15, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258; Gasper v. Parbs, 2001 WI App 259, ¶ 8, 249 Wis.
2d 106, 637 N.W.2d 399; Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 165, 423 N.W.2d 540, 542
(1988)).
79. Force, 2014 WI 82, ¶ 145. In another case, the doctrine applies to an interpretation
which “produces absurd results and defies both common sense and the fundamental purpose” of the act. Teschendorf, 2006 WI 89, ¶ 43.
80. Force, 2014 WI 82, ¶¶ 165–66 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).
81. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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doing so would render the statute nonsensical or superfluous or create
an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could
not have intended it.”82 Under this test, the doctrine has “a narrow
domain, insisting that a given construction cross a high threshold of
unreasonableness before we conclude that a statute does not mean
what it says.”83 Importantly for the contrast with Force, Griffith quotes
this passage from a previous D.C. Circuit case: “Because our role is not
to ‘correct’ the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes, we
will not ratify an interpretation that abrogates the enacted statutory
text absent an extraordinarily convincing justification.”84 After reviewing the government’s arguments concerning its reading of the Affordable Care Act, the court in Halbig concludes: “The government has
failed to make the extraordinary showing required for such judicial
rewriting of an act of Congress.”85
Kalal did not address the absurd-results doctrine beyond preserving its legitimacy for future cases.86 However, the Force case highlights
the importance of clarifying these few words from Kalal.87 In the next
case, which presents such an opportunity, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court should clarify the standards necessary to find an absurd result.
Halbig provides a good start: the absurdity doctrine has a “narrow
domain” which requires a “high threshold” and an “extraordinary
showing” of an “extraordinarily convincing justification” before the
Court overrides the plain meaning of a statute.
C. When is a Statute Ambiguous?
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Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

82. Id. at 402 (internal quotation omitted).
83. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
84. Id. at 403 (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
85. Id. at 406.
86. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis. 2d 633,
681 N.W.2d 110
87. See Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶¶ 158, 165, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850
N.W.2d 866 (Roggensack, J., dissenting; Ziegler, J., dissenting).
88. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶ 67, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d
258 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“The ambiguous/unambiguous, literal, plain meaning
debate is a word game. The characterization of ‘ambiguous,’ ‘unambiguous,’ ‘literal,’ and
‘plain meaning’ are in the eyes of the beholder and appear to be conclusory labels a court
pins on a statute.”). See also Juneau Cty. v. Courthouse Emps., Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630,
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Deciding that a statutory provision is ambiguous is as much art as
science. Some may say the exercise is meaningless, nothing more than
a “conclusory label[] a court pins on a statute.”88 Nonetheless, the
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642 n.8, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998).
89. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 47.
90. Id. (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28,
¶ 21, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).
91. Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶ 26, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d
893.
92. State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W. 2d 346 (1980).
93. Teschendorf, 2006 WI 89, ¶ 20 (citations omitted).
94. Id. ¶ 19. See Seider v. O’Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 30, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d
659.
95. Teschendorf, 2006 WI 89, ¶ 19 (courts); State v. Schwarz, 2004 WI App 136, ¶ 19, 275
Wis. 2d 225, 685 N.W.2d 585 (Schudson, J., dissenting) (state officials).
96. State v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶ 20, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703.
97. Seider, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 46 (citations omitted).

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 162 Side A

Court has laid down a number of rules and tools to help judges determine when a statute is ambiguous.
The fundamental rule is stated in Kalal: a statute is ambiguous
when “it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in two or more senses.”89 Phrased slightly differently, a statute is ambiguous when “statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise
to different meanings.”90 People may arrive at differing reasonable
readings because the legislature used imprecise terms91 or through this
provision’s interaction with or relation to other statutes.92 “A statute
that is unambiguous in one context may be ambiguous in another, because words cannot anticipate every possible fact situation.”93
The test for multiple reasonable readings of a statute is not met
“simply because the parties, the circuit court, and the court of appeals
disagree as to its meaning.”94 However, it may be indicative of ambiguity when courts or state officials disagree as to a statute’s meaning.95
Another sign of ambiguity is when a court can create clarity simply by
adding a word here or there to reach a definitive meaning.96
Courts should not be eager to declare a statute ambiguous. “A
statute is not ambiguous simply because it is general enough to apply
in more than one circumstance. Nor is a statute ambiguous if the facts
of a case make the statute difficult to apply.”97 At bottom, the court
must do its own independent work to determine whether a statute is
ambiguous. It cannot take the easy road, throwing up its hands and
declaring, “the parties disagree,” or “the lower courts disagree,” or
even “the dissenters disagree.” Instead, the court must do the job laid
out by Kalal—it must use the tools of plain meaning to analyze a statute. Only after the court has satisfied itself that multiple reasonable

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 162 Side B

06/19/2017 09:53:44

6 SUHR-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

986

6/12/17 2:00 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[100:969

readings exist in this case may it turn to extrinsic sources to resolve the
ambiguity it has found.
D. What Extrinsic Tools are Available to Resolve Ambiguity?
Once a court has determined that a statute is ambiguous, it is generally believed that any manner of illuminative extrinsic source is acceptable.98 However, courts must bear in mind that not all extrinsic
aids are created equal—some are more reliable and objective than others.99 Extrinsic sources can “potentially include a broad array of material, reliable and unreliable, objective and subjective.”100
We generally think of legislative history as the most common form
of extrinsic source, which could include materials from the Legislative
Reference Bureau, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Legislative Council, floor
remarks recorded in the journals, or gubernatorial veto messages,
among others.101 On the more reliable end, a committee staff report
may reflect the consensus understanding of an entire drafting committee. On the more unreliable end, a letter from a lobbyist is the opinion
of one person from outside the formal process given with a particular
motive.102 The court may also use its own powers of reasoning to discern a legislative purpose or goal which motivated the statute.103
There is an entire statutory construction literature on the varieties of
evidence of legislative intention, and it is not my purpose to explicate
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98. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 50, 271 Wis. 2d
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
99. State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 108 n.39, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (Sykes, J.,
concurring). See also Seider, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 62 (“Extrinsic aids include postenactment events.
Although these materials are probative, we approach nonlegislative sources cautiously, and
we do not afford them the same relevance or weight as evidence of legislative intent.”). But
see Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc’y, 2003 WI 87, ¶ 44, 263 Wis. 2d 207, 665 N.W.2d 181
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“Courts must look to all relevant available evidence of legislative intent, with no single factor controlling, and interpret a statute consistently with the
preponderance of that evidence.”).
100. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 108 n.39 (Sykes, J., concurring).
101. See Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 69 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
102. See, e.g., Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶ 49–55, 293 Wis. 2d
123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (looking to a Legislative Reference Bureau staff analysis, a lobbyist’s
comments, and a leading treatise).
103. See Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.—Mayo Health Sys., 2005 WI 124, ¶ 104,
285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201 (Roggensack, J., concurring) (citing Sonnenburg v.
Grohskopf, 144 Wis. 2d 62, 65, 422 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1988) (“When a statute is ambiguous, the legislature is presumed to intend the interpretation that advances the purpose
of the statute.”)).

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 163 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

6 SUHR-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/12/17 2:00 PM

INTERPRETING WISCONSIN STATUTES

987

in depth these questions here.104 Rather, my point is simple. In the
next relevant case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should say explicitly
what it has implied previously: not all extrinsic sources are equally authoritative, and when using extrinsic sources to resolve ambiguity,
courts should not adopt an “everything and the kitchen sink” approach to analyzing their insights. Rather, courts should weigh objective, widely representative sources over subjective, single-speaker
sources.
V. THE FUTURE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN WISCONSIN
In State v. Beyers in 2003, Chief Justice Abrahamson lamented that
“the case law” of the Court “adopt[s] inconsistent approaches to statutory interpretation.”105 She called for the court to “clearly adopt a
more encompassing analytic model for statutory interpretation.”106
The next term the Court emphatically adopted an analytic model for
statutory interpretation in Kalal.107 Since then, Justice Abrahamson has
been on a sustained campaign against Kalal’s holding, sowing the very
confusion she previously decried.108 In the term of Kalal and the term
following, some judges or justices acted as though the case did not exist.109 After an initial push-back period, however, Kalal seemed to survive and thrive, putting down deep roots and making clear that it was
here to stay. Fewer cases seemed to attack its holding or ignore it
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104. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005).
105. In re Commitment of Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶ 46, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
106. Id. ¶ 47.
107. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
108. See, e.g., Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., 2011 WI 37, ¶ 5, 333 Wis. 2d 580, 798
N.W.2d 223.
109. See, e.g., compare Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.—Mayo Health Sys., 2005 WI
124, ¶ 26, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201 (determining statutory meaning “in light of (A) the
text of the statute; (B) the legislative history of the statute; (C) the legislative goal in adopting the statute; and three concepts of law embodied in the statute.”), with id. ¶ 121 (Wilcox,
J., dissenting). Compare Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶ 19, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296
(engaging in statutory construction by looking to “the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the common law meaning of the phrase in question” without reference to
Kalal), with id. ¶¶ 100–02 & n.12 (Prosser, J., dissenting). Compare State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80,
273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (see discussion supra pp. 107–08), with In re Madison Cmty.
Found., 2005 WI App 239, ¶ 23, 288 Wis. 2d 128, 707 N.W.2d 285 (Dykman, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for engaging in statutory construction without reference to Kalal).
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completely.
But the effort to supplant or undermine Kalal has taken on renewed
vigor in the last few years.110 In Abrahamson’s majority opinion in
Klemm v. American Transmission Co. she asserted her own style of statutory interpretation without providing any citation or justification: “We
examine the texts of Wis. Stat. § 32.06 and § 32.28(3)(d) . . . the statutes
in the context of the condemnation statutes, the legislative purpose of
awarding litigation expenses, and the legislative history of §§ 32.06
and 32.28(3)(d).”111 Her opinion first reviews the plain text, then conducts a review of “legislative purpose” that she concludes “supports”
her plain-text analysis.112
She then decides that the legislative history gives “some support”
to that interpretation by looking first to “the work of the Legislative
Council Special Committee on Eminent Domain,” namely a staff brief
and the committee report.113 She concludes that the Committee material “does not enlighten us about the legislature’s intended meaning of
the language” at issue.114 From there she proceeds to the legislative
drafting file, such as a single member asking the Legislative Reference
Bureau to draft a particular amendment and two members seeking another amendment, but “[n]othing in the legislative history clarifies the
impetus for these amendments.”115 Nevertheless, though “[t]here is
nothing explicit in the drafting records” suggesting a link between the
two provisions at issue in the case, the legislature adopted the
amendments contemporaneously, and from that “we may surmise” a
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110. Interestingly, though much has been written about Justice Louis Butler’s tenure
on the court (2004–2008), virtually all analysis focused on constitutional and common-law
cases—none of the four substantive critiques of the Court’s cases during that period discussed statutory interpretation. Perhaps it is a sign of Kalal’s persuasiveness and staying
power that it did not come under significant attack during the Butler era. See Michael
Brennan, Are Courts Becoming Too Activist: Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Has Shown a Worrisome
Turn In That Direction, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2005, at 1J; Diane S. Sykes, Reflections
On The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2006); Rick Esenberg, A Court Unbound? The Recent Jurisprudence of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (2007) (Federalist Society
White Paper), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/a-court-unboundthe-recent-jurisprudence-of-the-wisconsin-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/8P8Q-VX2X];
Charles J. Sykes, Wisconsin’s Activist Court, WISCONSIN INTEREST, Vol. 14 No. 3, available at
http://www.wpri.org/WIInterest/Syk14.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN9D-A8V3] (2005).
111. Klemm, 2011 WI 37, ¶ 5.
112. Id. ¶ 41.
113. Id. ¶¶ 51–54.
114. Id. ¶ 56.
115. Id. ¶ 61.
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116. Id. ¶¶ 57–62.
117. Id. ¶¶ 63–64.
118. See id.
119. Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶¶ 30–31, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850
N.W.2d 866 (quoting Seider v. O’Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d
659).
120. Id. ¶ 48.
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conclusion.116 At bottom, “[t]he legislative history of the two revisions
to ch. 32 provides no evidence contrary to our interpretation,” and the
“limited legislative history [as a whole] gives some support to our interpretation.”117 No one dissented from the opinion; no one pointed
out its utter incompatibility with Kalal or expressed concern about conclusions reached by surmising a lack of contradiction.118
Having injected Klemm into the bloodstream without any citation
to precedent, that case is now available to serve as precedent itself,
making its propositions somehow acceptable because there is a recent
unanimous decision setting them forth. Thus Abrahamson could cite
Klemm to say in the majority opinion in Force v. American Family:
In examining the statutory text, however, we do more
than focus on a dictionary definition of each word.
Words are given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible results and results that are clearly at
odds with the legislature’s purpose. We scrutinize the
words in view of the purpose of the statute. We consider the meaning of words in the context in which they
appear. The definition of a word or phrase can vary in
different circumstances. Different fact scenarios may
require different interpretations of the text, because
words cannot anticipate every possible fact situation.
“[R]easonable minds can differ about a statute’s application when the text is constant but the circumstances to
which the text may apply are kaleidoscopic.” We also
examine our case law interpreting the statute and the
statutory history of the statute to determine the meaning of words.119
In Force, Abrahamson sets out to “fill the gap in the statute” because of the “unique fact scenario of the instant case.”120 Her “study of
the text demonstrates that we are unable to discern the answer to our
inquiry in the present case by a mere examination of the words of Wis.
Stat. § 895.04(2) isolated from interpretive aids. We next look for assistance from the legislative pronouncement of the purposes” of the stat-
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121. Id. ¶ 55.
122. Id. ¶ 115–16.
123. Id. ¶ 158 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
124. Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, ¶ 49, 361 Wis. 2d 63, 862 N.W.2d 304.
125. Id. ¶¶ 49–51. See Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶ 61, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849
N.W.2d 837 (including “consequences of alternative interpretations”); In re Commitment of
Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶ 84, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)
(same).
126. Anderson, 2015 WI 19, ¶ 62.
127. Id. ¶¶ 64–78.
128. Id. ¶¶ 74–76.
129. Id. ¶ 79.
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utes.121 From the purposes to the case law, and from the case law to
the statutory history, though Abrahamson pines that the drafting file
from two amendments made fifty years ago “does not reveal the backstory” for the changes.122
Thankfully, in Force three justices dissented to call out Abrahamson’s departure from the Court’s usual method for statutory interpretation. Justice Patience Roggensack wrote, “While the majority opinion’s result is appealing, I cannot join the majority opinion’s
interpretation of the Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) term ‘surviving spouse.’ The
methods employed to interpret § 895.04(2) comport with none of the
legal principles that guide statutory interpretation. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Kalal. . . . Saying that § 895.04(2) means whatever the majority wants it
to mean will cause confusion and repetitive litigation.”123
Most recently in Anderson v. Aul, Abrahamson propounds a whole
hierarchy as though it is the usual way of doing things: “The court has
set forth the tools of statutory interpretation many times.”124 Having
made that assertion, she proceeds to cite two pre-2004 cases and Klemm
for the following tools: text, context, statutory history, case law, legislative purpose, and “the consequences of alternative interpretations.”125
In the Anderson decision, she looks to the minutes of the Insurance
Laws Revision Committee of the Legislative Council, but finds them
unhelpful for the question at hand.126 She then marches through various versions of the statute over the years, and again finds them of no
bearing on the instant issue.127 Hope first arises from the Legislative
Council notes to the laws of 1975, which “seem to signify” and “suggest” something potentially useful.128
The baldest assertion of judicial power comes from her discussion
Indeed,
of “the consequences of alternative interpretations.”129
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Id. ¶ 80.
Id. ¶ 81.
Id. ¶ 82.
Id. ¶¶ 83–84.
Id. ¶ 106 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. ¶ 107 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
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130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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“[s]trictly limiting the time in which an insured must report a claim
can lead to harsh results for the insured and third-party victims.”130
Later, “we are concerned that a decision favorable to [the insurer] in
the present case may open the door for insurance companies to incorporate similar reporting requirements into a wide range of insurance
policies and thereby circumvent the consumer protection aspects of
these notice-prejudice statutes.”131 At the same time, “if we interpret
the notice-prejudice statutes to apply to the reporting requirement . . . ,
we will in effect rewrite the terms of such policies.”132 What is a court
to do in such a dilemma? Well, having scoured all available materials,
having searched high and low and failing to “locate anything in the
statutory text, the history of claims-made-and-reported policies, the
statutory history, or the Committee materials,” the Court is left to
simply make the judgment call that “to rewrite the fundamental terms
of the WILMIC insurance policy would be unreasonable.”133 There
you have it.
A four-justice majority concurred in the case, led by Justice Ziegler,
who focuses on the statutory interpretation question. She states that a
majority of the Court concluded that the statute was not ambiguous,
that its plain meaning dictated the outcome, and that “[t]he opinion of
the court was to be written to clearly state these conclusions,” citing
Kalal.134 However, Abrahamson chose to ignore the wishes of her colleagues expressed at conference and reiterated during the opinion
drafting process, “reject[ing] suggested changes to the opinion which
would make these conclusions clear. . . .”135
Thus, Ziegler wrote to “clarify that although a court may consider
whether a particular interpretation of a statute would produce an absurd or unreasonable result, a court may not balance the policy concerns associated with the ‘consequences of alternative interpretations,’” a “more subjective” analysis which she finds “seemingly
inconsistent with our jurisprudence.”136 She notes that Abrahamson
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first created this language in State v. Hayes in 2004.137 At the time, Justice Sykes labeled this factor “new to our statutory interpretation jurisprudence, and the majority cites no authority for it.”138 Sykes criticized
the consideration as a “judicial policy judgment” that “leaves rooms
for the substitution of the judiciary’s subjective policy choices for those
of the legislature, a phenomenon that a text-based, plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation seeks to guard against.”139 A decade
later, Ziegler finds this subjective “consequences” analysis equally
“problematic.”140
The Anderson case as a whole is especially angst-inducing because
Abrahamson’s “lead opinion” lacked four votes.141 Indeed, a majority
of the Court joined Ziegler’s plain-meaning opinion. Yet due to the
Court’s unique system of case assignment, whereby authors are randomly chosen from among the majority at conference,142 Abrahamson
was able to write an opinion that many would assume to be the governing, majority opinion if they did not look closer. Dean Joseph D.
Kearney of Marquette University Law School has called the bar’s attention to this phenomenon and rightly urged the Court to reform its
practice to align with “general American tradition (and logic)” so the
opinion joined by the majority of justices is issued first.143
Justice A.W. Bradley, who initially declined to join either opinion
in Kalal and who reiterated her ambivalence in Hayes,144 has generally
avoided Abrahamson’s crusade, and pays more traditional obeisance
to Kalal, once citing Kalal a sentence before citing Klemm as though the
two were entirely simpatico.145 Yet her recent opinion in Bank of New
York Mellon v. Carson raises concerns about her approach.146 A.W.
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137. Id. ¶ 115 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (citing State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 16, 273 Wis.
2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203).
138. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 112 (Sykes, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Anderson, 2015 WI 19, ¶ 115 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
141. Id. ¶ 106 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
142. Wis. Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Procedures, Section III.F,
https://wicourts.gov/sc/IOPSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBJ-BMTY] (last amended Feb.
13, 2017).
143. Joseph D. Kearney, The Wisconsin Supreme Court, Can We Help?, MARQ. LAW., at 48
(Fall 2015).
144. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 66 (Bradley, J., concurring).
145. Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co., 2014 WI 28, ¶ 17, 353 Wis. 2d 619, 847 N.W.2d 324.
146. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 2015 WI 15, ¶¶ 20–41, 361 Wis. 2d 23, 859
N.W.2d 422.
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Bradley begins by reciting the usual litany about statutory interpretation and Kalal, and then turns to the plain meaning of the word “shall”
in a provision that “judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10
except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon
the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.”147 She notes that the word shall is “presumed mandatory” by
the case law, but there is no “per se” rule that it is so.148 She then cites
two pre-Kalal cases for the propositions that the “court considers legislative intent in determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory” and “factors to consider in determining whether a
statute is mandatory include ‘the statute’s nature, the legislative objective for the statute, and the potential consequences to the parties, such
as injuries and wrongs.’”149 In this particular instance, after evaluating
the language in its statutory context, she concludes that shall is in fact
mandatory.150
In the next section, she analyzes the phrase “upon expiration of 5
weeks” from the same statute.151 She decides without explanation that
the word “upon” is ambiguous and looks to context, legislative history, and legislative purpose to find its intended meaning.152 In the legislative history section, she considers remarks by the four speakers at
the public hearing on the most recent amendment: the bill sponsor and
three lobbyists.153 Based on this testimony, she discerns the purpose of
the bill, and then decides that one party’s interpretation would “exacerbate the problem the statute was meant to ameliorate.”154 In fact,
“[m]ultiple studies have remarked upon the negative impact of such a
scenario.”155 Based then on context and history, she construes the stat-
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147. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (2013–2014)).
148. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
149. Id. ¶ 22 (citing State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 15, 262 Wis. 2d 720,
665 N.W.2d 155; and then citing State v. Thomas, 2000 WI App 162, ¶ 9, 238 Wis. 2d 216, 617
N.W.2d 230).
150. Id. ¶ 23.
151. Id. ¶¶ 29–41.
152. Id. ¶ 31.
153. Id. ¶ 35 (referencing the bill hearing video on Wisconsin Eye’s website).
154. Id. ¶ 37.
155. Id. ¶¶ 38–39 (first quoting U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–11–93, Mortg.
Foreclosures: Additional Mortg. Servicer Actions Could Help Reduce the Frequency and Impact of
Abandoned Forcelosures 29, 30 (Nov. 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1193.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9T8A-ZP89]; then quoting Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Re-entering the Market through Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
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ute to further the supposed statutory purpose.156
Cases like these—Klemm, Force, Anderson, Bank of New York
Mellon—all serve the same end: they create an alternative body of doctrine that intentionally ignores Kalal and presumes an accepted approach to statutory interpretation utterly at odds with its holding.
Having lost the vote in Kalal, Abrahamson simply ignores it and uses
her occasional majority opinions to write as though it does not exist.
Sometimes, as in Force and Anderson, her colleagues rightly call out this
furtive undermining of Kalal. Other times, as in Klemm and Bank of
New York Mellon, they allow odious propositions to proceed without
comment or dissent, thus further embedding them into mainstream
doctrine. If justices (and judges on the court of appeals) believe in
Kalal and its vision for text-first interpretation, or if they simply respect
precedent and doctrine, then they should not cite Klemm and its progeny in their opinions, and they should be vigilant to call out and criticize when their colleagues write opinions at odds with Kalal’s method.
Subjectivist statutory interpretation must be named and rebuked at
every turn if Kalal is to remain the law of the land; otherwise lower
court judges will begin using Klemm and company as legitimizing
precedent to return to the days of leveraging legislative history to legislate from the bench.
VI. CONCLUSION
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25, 29–30 (2013); and then quoting Kristin M. Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind On Their Mortgages, Lenders Playing the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Paying the Price,
34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621, 633 (2010)).
156. Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
157. Gluck, supra note 4, 1800. See id. (“Wisconsin’s textualist approach also is treated
as precedential.”); Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, ¶ 42 n.9, 286
Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853 (describing Kalal as “our case law on statutory interpretation”);
State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176, ¶ 12, 276 Wis. 2d 434, 687 N.W.2d 526 (Kalal “set forth
governing principles of statutory construction”). Gluck, supra note 4, at pp. 1800–01 n.182,
provides a detailed explanation for the author’s finding that Kalal controls with numerous
citations.
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I began this article making perhaps a bold claim: that Kalal is a
landmark or watershed case in the recent history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I end my inquiry convinced that Wisconsin courts have
accepted Kalal as the “controlling interpretive approach” for statutory
interpretation.157 It is the standard reference point by which five of the
seven sitting justices decide cases of statutory interpretation, and the
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other two must write within the context it creates even if they disagree.158 In this regard alone it is an improvement on the state of the
doctrine in the years prior to its issuance, when lower courts and the
bar lacked clarity as to the Supreme Court’s framework for deciding
these important issues.
In addition to bringing needed stability and predictability to the
statutory interpretation, it has brought those same virtues to the law as
a whole through its textualist emphasis. Now lower courts and the bar
know not only that they should use a textualist method, but they know
as well that it is the text of the law that governs in all circumstances
when questions arise, not unenacted intent or the social consequences
of competing alternative interpretations.
Moreover, the evidence from the cases indicates that Kalal succeeded in its mission to cabin the use of extrinsic sources in statutory interpretation. The court of appeals shows a significant decrease in citations to extrinsic sources in the ten years after Kalal compared to the
ten years prior to its issuance.
It is, then, a landmark opinion—it marks a break from the past, and
it set the course for the future. Its method has been expanded beyond
statutory interpretation to numerous other areas of public law. And
although one or two justices prefer an alternative methodology that is
far more inclusive of extrinsic sources and policy considerations, they
are forced to operate always in its shadow. Such consistent, persistent
methodological consensus within a state’s entire judiciary is indeed an
achievement worth of a great court.
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158. Gluck, supra note 4, 1802–03 (“[A]lthough Chief Justice Abrahamson, along with
her colleague Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, occasionally write separately to urge a more comprehensive approach (that includes nontextual sources), they have essentially conceded that
Kalal is the controlling approach and generally dispute only its case-specific application.”).
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